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Contours of the Czech Environmental Movement: a comparative analysis of Hnuti Duha 
(Rainbow Movement) and Jihoceske matky (South Bohemian Mothers)1 
 
Adam Fagin (Queen Mary, University of London) 
Petr Jehlicka (Open University) 
 
Abstract 
 
The two case studies, representing distinct strands of the Czech environmental movement, challenge 
contemporary claims that in the age of globalisation the significance of the national context in shaping protest 
and agency is declining. The specific context of post-communist political reform and economic restructuring is 
emphasised as a key determinant of environmental organisations’ activity and behaviour. Strategic choices and 
actions of both organisations can be understood as responses to their dependency on external funding. Financial 
dependence on external agencies with their own agendas and interests can dis-empower and de-legitimise 
environmental movement organisations. Assumptions regarding the impact of resources on strategic choices and 
campaigns require qualification when applied to movement organisations beyond established capitalist 
democracies. 
 
Introduction 
The academic literature on environmental mobilisation in central and eastern Europe (CEE) is 
now extensive. Research has focused either on the role played by environmental activists in 
the collapse of soviet-style communism [Fagin, 1994; Waller and Millard, 1992; Tickle and 
Vavrousek, 1998], or has offered general analysis of environmental movements, 
organisational development and the institutionalisation of protest during democratic 
consolidation [Szabo, 1994 ; Kubik,1998; Manning, 1998].  
However, there has not yet been a detailed analysis of the breadth and diversity of 
environmental movement organisations (EMOs)2 within CEE states to parallel the analysis 
that has taken place of western organisations.3 We know about general trends towards 
professionalism and institutionalisation, but what about more radical organisations that have 
neither disappeared (as might have been predicted) nor become more ‘professional’? As 
Meyer and Tarrow have noted, ‘More important than the various trajectories, or their 
importance to different types of movements, is the recognition that the variety of 
organizational outcomes (within a movement) provides social movements with a wider range 
of possibilities for subsequent action than previous theories of social movements 
acknowledged’ [1998: 19]. The depiction of general trends within a social movement can 
obscure the diversity of organisational forms within the movement itself. 
 
This paper challenges the depiction of generalised trends within the Czech environmental 
movement by considering the extent to which professionalism and ‘Europeanisation’ have 
1 This is a revised version of a paper first presented at the 2000 ECPR Joint Sessions in Copenhagen, Workshop 
‘Environmental Organizations: A Comparative Assessment’. The authors would like to thank workshop 
participants and three anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply. 
2 We use the term EMO (environmental movement organisation) to describe organisations that form within the 
overall environmental movement and essentially constitute that movement. This is of course a broad 
classification within which there will be substantial variation in organisational forms and purpose. When dealing 
with the theoretical literature on social movement organisations we refer at times more generally to ‘SMOs’ 
(social movement organisations). 
   
3 Both analysis of national west European environmental movement organisations and comparative analysis is 
extensive. See Jamison et al, 1990; Diani 1995; Rootes, 1999; Kriesi et al., 1995.  
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become endemic features of EMO activity. We attempt to capture the diversity and breadth of 
the Czech movement by focusing on two quite different organisational types – the highly 
professional, globally connected and elite-focused Czech chapter of FoE (Hnuti Duha) and a 
locally-based non-hierarchic organisation, South Bohemian Mothers (Jihoceske matky), run 
by women. Though it is possible to differentiate between these two organisations in terms of 
the way they operate, their political efficacy, their location and their internal organisation, 
they have both campaigned against the nuclear power plant at Temelin in Southern Bohemia. 
This provides an empirical basis for comparing different organisational forms, approaches and 
strategies applied to the same issue. Beyond developing the study of Czech EMOs, the value 
of our empirical analysis is revealing about the political opportunity structure of the Czech 
Republic and the effect of externally generated resources on the building of indigenous 
organisations.  
Our research also provides a critique of the extensive theoretical discourse on social 
movement organisations derived from the experience of organisations in established western 
democracies [Kriesi, 1995; Della Porta and Diani, 1999; Meyer and Tarrow, 1998]. 
Conceptualisations of openness versus closure, national versus local, formal versus informal 
access all gain new dimensions in the context of a young democracy undergoing rapid and far-
reaching social and economic transformation at the behest of external organisations and global 
agencies. We conclude that the specific context of the ‘triple transition’ remains decisive in 
determining how individual EMOs develop and operate.  
 
 
Theorising EMO activity in the Czech Republic 
The evolution of western environmental movement organisations from radical participatory 
‘new’ social movements, to networks of formalised, professional mass membership 
organisations has influenced both the theory and practice of environmental politics in the 
Czech Republic. The perception of the environmental movement as being on a continuum 
from submerged oppositional social movement in the months prior to the ‘velvet revolution’ 
towards increased institutionalisation and professionalism remains the dominant discourse and 
underscores much existing analysis of the Czech environmental movement, as well as 
environmental politics in CEE generally [Pickvance, 1998; Jancar Webster, 1998].  
Analysing the evolution of the Czech environmental movement over the past decade from the 
perspective of the western developmental model enables a classification of Czech EMOs 
based on levels of institutionalisation, bureaucratisation, repertoires of action, internal 
organisational structure, involvement of membership. It also offers a basis on which to 
monitor changes and progression as defined, in many cases, by the EMOs themselves.4  
Yet analysing Czech EMOs from the perspective of a linear developmental course from 
radicalism to institutionalisation and professionalism is based on a somewhat inaccurate 
portrayal of developments within western EMOs during the past three decades. Whilst a 
general trend towards professionalism, resource endowment and institutionalisation may be 
characteristic of western environmental movements, their political capacity has always relied 
on the diversity of strategies and organisational forms within the movements [Meyer and 
Tarrow, 1998: 19]. Though some western organisations have become more professional and 
institutionalised, organisational diversity and grassroots activism have remained a feature of 
western environmental movements that have in some countries (e.g. the UK) become 
increasingly prominent in recent years [Wall, 1999; Crozat, 1998: 60]. Rather than seeing the 
4 What we refer to here is that many activists within EMOs define their organisations in terms of  following a 
western trajectory. They see increased professionalism and formalisation as objectives (Interviews with Daniel 
Vondrous, Hnuti Duha, May, 1999, November 2000). 
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shift towards professionalism and the decline of radicalism amongst a core of Czech EMOs as 
evidence of westernisation, such trends should be recognised as a reaction to the specific 
structural context of the Czech Republic’s transition from Soviet-style communism to neo-
liberal capitalism [Fagin and Jehlicka, 1998]. 
To assume that the Czech environmental movement is a stage or so behind western 
movements and is merely going through a necessary developmental phase of de-radicalisation 
and institutionalisation is also problematic insofar as this view is based on the belief that the 
CEE states are destined to follow a western course of development. The problem with such a 
perspective when applied to environmental politics is that it implies that Czech activists face 
the same political and economic scenarios that European campaigners faced a generation or so 
ago and that they must therefore go through the same stages of professionalism and 
institutionalisation. The persistence and re-birth of radical direct action within western 
movements is conveniently overlooked in the quest for evidence of organisational maturation. 
Yet Czech EMOs face aggressive foreign direct investment and an increasingly diffused 
power structure. Rather than replicating a bygone stage of western development, they face a 
political and economic context in which pro-growth neo-liberal consumerism and 
subservience to foreign direct investment is the accepted mantra.  
 
 
Identifying organisational types 
Once freed from both the ‘catch-up’ approach to environmental mobilisation in the Czech 
Republic and the focus on professionalism and institutionalisation, recent attempts within the 
contemporary western theoretical literature to capture the diversity of social movements can 
be applied in order to locate Czech organisations within a comparative analytical framework. 
Diani and Donati’s [1999] typology of western social movement organisations captures the 
transformation and the hybridised nature of their strategies and organisational logic that has 
resulted in a breadth of organisational forms. Challenging the rigid dichotomy between 
professionalism and grass-roots action that divided earlier research [Lowe and Goyder, 1982; 
Jordan and Maloney, 1997], their model offers a typology of activism that captures the 
dynamics and pragmatism of late capitalist protest. Diani and Donati’s model identifies four 
broad organisational types based on two dimensions: professionalism versus participation, and 
disruptive versus conventional forms of activism:  
 
• Public Interest Lobby  
• Participatory Protest Organisation 
• Professional Protest Organisation   
• Participatory Pressure Group  
 
Organisational forms are determined by the mix of strategies selected by particular 
organisations. Decisions are made regarding the mobilisation of time and or resources 
depending on the specific campaign and issues [1999: 16-17].  
Diani and Donati’s typology is useful to identify different strategies and organisational forms 
amongst Czech EMOs. Organisations could be classified rather superficially on the basis of an 
apparent shift towards professionalism, or resemblance to contemporary western 
organisations. However, many of the constraints on Czech EMOs are highly particular and 
relate specifically to the complexities involved in trying to establish civil society in a post-
authoritarian state. Even when a trend towards westernisation is clearly discernible, the 
specific political context as well as dependency on external funding impose developmental 
constraints that may not be temporary or transitional, but endemic and long-term. Though 
there may well be a link between resources and strategies and organisational forms in the 
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Czech Republic, the dynamics of the ‘triple transition’ as well as the legacy of authoritarian 
rule and the events of the late 1980s are likely to mediate and moderate causal factors of 
organisational behaviour [Fagin, 2001]. 
 
 
Explaining the political role, function and strategies of EMOs  
In the theoretical literature on social movements, the ‘political process’ or ‘political 
opportunity structure’ approach [Eisinger, 1973; Piven and Cloward, 1977] focuses on the 
nature, culture, organisation and functioning of the national political system as a determinant 
of organisational activity [McAdam and Snow, 1996; Tilly et al, 1978; Gamson and Meyer, 
1996; Kriesi et al, 1995]. The variables that are deemed to affect strategic choice and patterns 
of organisation amongst SMOs in western Europe are used here as the basis of a series of 
hypotheses to be tested by reference to the Czech EMOs studied. 
 
The nature of the state 
It is widely assumed that strong, repressive centralised states produce strong well-organised 
movement organisations with radical agenda [Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 154; Kriesi, 1995: 
51-52]. On the basis of a comparative study of social movement activity in four west 
European states, Kriesi et al [1995] conclude that weak and inclusive states give rise to high 
levels of mobilisation and moderate action repertoires. It is assumed that a decentralised state 
will provide more access and opportunities for contestation. Distinguishing between formal 
and informal activity, they claim that such political systems encourage strongly developed 
formal organisations. In contrast, strong states give rise to radicalism, lower levels of 
mobilisation which tends ‘to be concentrated in unconventional forms’ [Kriesi, 1995a: 51-2]. 
Moderately strong but highly inclusive states encourage strong SMOs committed to 
conventional forms of protest, but the lack of formal access means that unconventional forms 
of protest continue to be a feature of campaigns. Formal access breeds conventional protest, 
though the stronger the state the more radicalism.   
Such conclusions are partly endorsed by the Czech case. The environmental movement lacked 
informal access during the Klaus period (1992-97), but has regained such links since 1998 
with the advent of the CSSD minority government, which has consulted with activists from 
the main EMOs and has encouraged informal as well as formal links. The dividend appears to 
be that the main EMOs have become more professional and have fashioned themselves as 
partners in the EU-inspired policy process. Yet, rather than stimulate radical actions and 
agenda, the repressive style of the Klaus government – at one point three of the main EMOs 
were placed on a list of subversive organisations to be watched by the security services - 
prompted a de-radicalisation of EMOs and a decline in ideological diversity at a time when 
far-reaching policy decisions were being taken. A centralised, closed and exclusive state did 
not lead to more radical repertoires or encourage direct action. The dependency of Czech 
EMOs on the state and on foreign donors for funding5 acts as a constraint on their political 
adventure and mediates their interaction with the political process. 
Though constitutional reforms have brought a measure of decentralisation, the Czech state 
remains centralised. Yet the impact of the state on EMO access has to be seen as contingent 
on the influence of the IMF, WTO and other international financial organisations. The 
centralisation of the Czech state is more a remnant of the past than an expression of 
5 Though state funding for EMOs has always been small compared to foreign donations, funds from 
privatisation and other state funding represent an important source of income. At the local level, volunteer-based 
EMOs often depend upon the goodwill of the local authority to provide office space. In the absence of  
sustainable levels of private donations, there is still a higher level of state dependency compared to western 
European EMOs. 
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contemporary power. The veneer of empowerment is used by peripheral states to mask a ‘soft’ 
state that can do little about the direction or nature of economic activity [Strange, 1994: 7].  
The relationship between the Czech government, external political and economic 
organisations, and social movements is structured by the dynamics of economic and political 
transformation and is distinct from the situation in developed liberal capitalist states. In 
particular, the dominance of the EU in the field of Czech environmental policy impacts upon 
the relationship between organisations and the state. Rather than organisations demanding 
concessions from a relatively empowered state, there is a ‘dependency triangle’ in which the 
state’s subservience to the EU weakens its capacity to offer concessions or to take decisive 
action [Stadler, 1994]. As the main provider of funding to organisations, as well as dictating 
legislation and regulatory structures, the EU has altered the relationship between the state and 
EMOs. Dependent on EU funding, the larger Prague-based EMOs have largely accepted the 
ecological modernisation agenda, whilst the centre-left government remains steadfastly 
committed to implementing the import-led enlargement programme devised by the chief 
executives of Europe’s largest corporations [Monbiot, 2000].  
This triangulation of power alters the impact of the domestic political process. Though the EU 
could potentially provide alternative opportunities for political access, it has weakened the 
political efficacy of EMOs who are forced to accept and work within agendas set by the 
European Commission.6 The activities and strategies of environmental organisations in 
western Europe are undoubtedly affected by the EU and other external organisations, but 
strong national governments play a more critical role in agenda -setting both domestically and 
at EU level and this enables established EMOs to exercise influence. The situation is very 
different in the Czech Republic where, in the run up to accession, the government has little 
capacity or inclination to resist foreign direct investment regardless of its ecological  impact. 
 
There are other more general problems with applying the political process approach to the 
study of EMO activity. The approach generally fails to identify or quantify the degree of 
impact exerted on EMOs by changes in the political system, or indeed how quickly the impact 
is likely to occur [Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 198-9]. This is particularly problematic for 
new democracies, where institutional processes and procedures may not yet be embedded, 
Moreover, as a set of variables the political process approach is less effective at explaining 
differing degrees of success amongst individual EMOs operating within the same political 
opportunity structure. In order to better understand why some organisations in certain contexts 
are able to mobilise support and orchestrate vibrant campaigns and others are not it is 
necessary to consider the factors that stimulate collective action. 
 
The impact of resources 
The resource mobilisation approach [Zald and McCarthy, 1987; Tilly, 1978; Oberschall, 
1973] portrays activists as rational actors who consciously decide to organise and mobilise on 
the basis of available  resources;  ‘the type and nature of the resources available explain the 
tactical choices made by movements and the consequences of collective action on the social 
and political system’ [Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 8].  
In the Czech case, the approach helps to explain why EMOs with access to resources have 
been better able to adopt a professional veneer and to gain political access than have others. 
Yet as with the political process approach, the danger lies in making deductions about the 
6 The Brno and Prague offices of Hnuti Duha spend considerable time applying for EU funding, either indirectly 
through the Regional Environmental Center, or through Phare via the Czech organisation NROS (Civil Society 
Development foundation). Arguably this is a distraction from campaigns and political activism. Funding rounds 
are announced based on specific themes and issues decided by the Commission in accordance with the accession 
agenda. EMOs are then set the task of putting in bids based on projects. 
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impact of resources on the capacity of EMOs without acknowledging the specific structural 
context in which they operate. Resource Mobilisation theory assumes a linkage, based on the 
western experience, between the availability of resources and action that is not necessarily 
replicated in a post-authoritarian context. For Czech EMOs resources come from external 
donors, who invariably impose particular agenda on recipient organisations. Moreover, the 
supply of resources (including know-how and technical assistance) is invariably temporary 
and cannot be deployed successfully without more long-term training and indigenous 
resources being available in the first place. In short, resources are a dependent rather than 
independent variable. How they can be used and what conditions are attached to them is 
critical.  
 
 
The Framing approach 
In understanding the different strategies and successes of Czech EMOs the framing approach 
is particularly useful insofar as it combines the impact of resources and political opportunities 
with the impact of the structural context [Gamson, 1995; Benford, 1993].  
The framing approach emphasises the way issues are presented and articulated by an 
organisation as the basis for explaining the success or failure of specific campaigns. Not only 
does it allow a distinction to be made between campaigns over the same issue, but also the 
varying success of the same issue over time. Thus, it focuses not just on the availability of 
resources (e.g. access to the media), but how such resources are deployed [Gamson, 1995].  
Political and cultural values of the society, plus the structural context in which an 
environmental issue has arisen become significant. How EMOs frame their campaigns, and 
how they are perceived by the public is critical.  
The advantage of the framing approach in the Czech case compared to political process or 
resource mobilisation theories is that it allows the specificity of the political and economic 
transition to be recognised as potentially moderating EMO activity. Rather than seeing 
organisational activity as the product of either the availability of resources or domestic 
political opportunities, the framing approach sees both as dependent on how the strategy and 
issue interact with specific political values and cultural context, as well as acknowledging the 
influence of the agenda of external donors whose framing of a particular issue may well prove 
decisive.  
 
Having critically reviewed the problems associated with the application of the various 
theoretical approaches to the study of EMOs to the Czech case, we are now in a position to 
further explore these issues by considering two case study EMOs: Hnuti Duha, the Czech 
chapter of FoE, and Jihoceske matky – South Bohemian Mothers.  
They have been selected because whilst they both campaign on the same issue, have 
embarked upon professionalism, and been the recipients of external funding and assistance, 
their organisational structure, campaign style and use of resources differs markedly. It is our 
aim to account for such differences and to explain how the specific political and economic 
context shapes the behaviour of two different organisations. 
 
  
Jihoceske matky – (South Bohemian Mothers) 
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The formation and profile of SBM 
Apart from the Prague Mothers,7 South Bohemian Mothers (SBM) is the only Czech women's 
environmental organisation that at least to some extent combines environmental with feminist 
concerns. It was established by a group of former school friends in 1990, though its roots date 
back to the period before November 1989. The organisation began as one woman’s response 
to nuclear activity and gradually grew into an informal, and subsequently more formal, group 
of female activists. Its headquarters is in Ceske Budejovice, the capital of the peripheral South 
Bohemian Region, some 40 kilometres from the Austrian border, and near the controversial 
Temelin nuclear power plant against which it campaigns. SBM have consciously decided to 
campaign in this region rather than establish an office in Prague.  
The combination of the fact that SBM is a women's group operating in a peripheral region 
with the highly technical nature of the major issue they address) puts SBM in a particularly 
difficult position as the public discourse on almost all aspects of social life, and especially 
nuclear energy, is dominated by technocratically oriented men. This is magnified by the fact 
that most leading SBM activists are women educated in the humanities.8  
Although SBM's database currently contains 2,000 names, the group has about 150 members 
who pay 100 CZK (3 euros) annual membership fee. The vast majority of these members are 
passive supporters, with an active core of 10-15 women. Members include women of all ages 
between 20 and 65. Most have secondary level education or are university graduates. 
However, though Ceske Budejovice is a large university town with a large student and 
academic population, the organisation has not significantly widened its membership.9 As a 
consequence of the severe reduction in its external funding, the group has recently cut back 
the number of employees to five, three of them part-time.  
 
 
Funding and resources 
Not long after their formation, SBM were approached by the Upper Austrian Anti-nuclear 
Platform (UAANP) with an offer of funding for SBM's campaign against Temelin. There 
followed what members describe as a 'happy time'. The money enabled SBM to rent spacious 
offices and, in co-operation with the Czech Foundation Against Nuclear Danger, to open an 
information centre in Ceske Budejovice, to expand the range of their activities beyond the 
anti-nuclear campaign, and generally to adopt a more professional demeanor. They took part 
in a series of public inquiries concerning all sorts of environmentally damaging projects 
throughout the South Bohemian region.  
As a result of the curtailment of financial support from UAANP in 1997, SBM ran into 
serious difficulties that threatened the continued existence of the organisation.10 Activists 
were forced to look for more modest offices and reduce the scope of their activities, to close 
the information centre and to discontinue their newsletter. They have maintained the core 
activities directed against Temelin such as lodging complaints to the district office for failing 
to force the investor - Czech Energy Company (CEZ) - to subject substantial change in the 
project to the EIA procedure, taking the district office and the company to court.  
7 The Prague Mothers is an organisations that was set up before 1989 to campaign against the health effects of 
air pollution on young children. The organisation still operates today, though it is less politically engaged than 
SBM. 
8 For example, the chairwoman is a secondary school teacher of foreign languages and a freelance translator 
9 This is a marked contrast with, for example, the Olomouc branch of Duha which is run almost entirely by 
student volunteers from the large multi-disciplinary Palacky university in the town. 
10 Whilst UAANP have continued to provide some money for SBM, this is on a much reduced scale and strictly 
on a project basis. 
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 Though the situation in which SBM now found itself was not dissimilar from that faced by 
other Czech EMOs, the organisation’s outright opposition to nuclear energy and the Temelin 
plant meant that they found it much harder to secure the support of foreign foundations, many 
of which endorsed nuclear energy as an alternative to burning brown coal. Similarly, there 
was no prospect of the organisation receiving any domestic funding from government-
sponsored sources whilst they vehemently opposed Temelin. Rather than develop their fee-
paying membership base, SBM concentrated on securing other sources of external funding 
and as a result, 90 per cent of their funding still comes from abroad.11  
 
Campaigns and strategies 
SBM is the only organisation in the Czech Republic to have actively and continuously 
campaigned against Temelin on health and ecological grounds.12 Other EMOs that at the start 
of the 1990s vehemently opposed Temelin ceased to campaign actively largely because 
nuclear energy was popular amongst citizens and politicians alike. At times SBM was a lone 
voice battling against national-level apathy and local hostility. Unlike other green activists, 
SBM refused to dilute or qualify their outright opposition to nuclear energy and the ill-fated 
plant. 
SBM is also involved in a campaign for the use of alternative energy, and a campaign to 
protect the South Bohemian landscape. On the nuclear issue, their strategy has mainly been to 
focus on the legal process demanding, for example, that EIA procedure is applied at least to 
the changes to the original project (the whole plant has never been subjected to EIA 
assessment). They have also taken part in public inquires on the location of radioactive waste 
storage in which they questioned the safety of the proposed alternatives. In the campaign on 
alternative energy, SBM’s strategy has been to organise exhibitions, give lectures at schools, 
call press conferences and publish articles mainly in the regional press. As one activist 
commented: 
 
‘It became impossible to do just Temelin. It is impossible to fight one great evil and at the 
same time ignore other evils. We had to do something as well against felling oaks or 
building an incinerator’ (Interview, 23/3/99).  
 
SBM also address various threats to the South Bohemian landscape arising mainly from 
private-sector initiatives and foreign investment schemes. Such proposals are usually backed 
by local politicians and mayors as they potentially offer employment opportunities to local 
people. Foreign investments are usually accepted on the basis that liberalisation is a basic 
tenet of economic restructuring. SBM in the mid 1990s opposed a project to build an 
incinerator in Mydlovary, a Dutch-sponsored project to convert a vast area of natural beauty 
into a recreational and leisure park to attract foreign tourists, and German-sponsored projects 
for large-capacity poultry farms, which would take advantage of much more lenient Czech 
regulation .   
11 The sources are quite diverse. Apart form UAANP, the Dutch foundation Milieukontakt OostEuropa provides 
funding, as well as a Swiss association of Christian women and an ornithological society from Germany. The 
Czech foundation Nadace Partnerstvi, whose sources of funding all originate from abroad, has recently granted 
150,000 Czech crowns for SBM's participation in public inquiries (Interview, SBM, 23/3/99).  
 
 
12 This is a contrast with other EMOs (such as Greenpeace CR and Duha) that did not campaign actively against 
Temelin through much of the 1990s. In the case of Duha, their more recent campaigns have tended to stress the 
economic and fiscal problems of the power plant.  
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What is particularly significant in the context of Czech politics and society is that SBM frame 
their environmental aims and objectives from a feminist perspective and actively strive to 
strengthen women's participation in politics and public life. Especially at the beginning, SBM 
activists experienced gross insults from their opponents simply because they were women; 
they were accused of being lay people meddling in the highly technical issue of nuclear 
energy, and of employing irrational and emotionally laden arguments. 
After an initial stage in which SBM was a purely participatory protest group engaging in 
demonstrations in front of the Temelin gates, the organisation came to resemble an 
organisation close to the professional protest organisation type identified by Diani and Donati 
[1999]. SBM employed a broad range of activities from classic lobbying in the Czech 
parliament to demonstrations. Apart from publishing their own newsletter Ztuha, they ran 
seminars on renewable energy, including wood-burning boilers and small hydropower plants. 
They also organised excursions for mayors to places where renewable energy was already 
used. At the same time, however, they were still organising demonstrations against Temelin in 
Ceske Budejovice or by the construction site.  
Due to the close co-operation with several groups from the Austrian anti-nuclear movement in 
the early 1990s, SBM were able to adopt their know-how and thus speed up the learning 
process that was taking the majority of regionally based EMOs a great deal longer. 
Nevertheless, SBM's leading activists interviewed in 1999 still critically evaluated their ability 
to act as a fully professional organisation in the first half of the 1990s. They lacked not only 
organisational skills and the ability to work effectively with the media, but also scientific and 
technical expertise. However, they believe they have learnt how to reach the public sphere 
through the media. To resolve the problem of inadequate expertise, they have gradually built 
up a circle of experts to whom they can turn for technical and scientific advice.  
 
The case of SBM illustrates the variety of factors influencing the strategies and organisational 
logic employed by an EMO. First, the content of the main policy issue they address (the 
construction of a nuclear power plant), combined with the character of the group (a women's 
group), puts them in a disadvantaged position. Second, during the whole decade in which they 
have been campaigning against Temelin, they have not expanded their operations beyond the 
South Bohemian region. SBM have adopted lobbying as a major method of their campaign, 
but political lobbying in the highly centralised Czech state is effective only if it is 
systematically employed in Prague. This seems a fundamental strategic barrier to the success 
of SBM in the anti-Temelin campaign, given that all institutions involved in the decision-
making process - the Czech energy company, the Ministry of Trade and Industry which is the 
regulator of the energy sector, the State Office for Nuclear Safety and the government and 
parliament - are based in Prague. As one SBM activist acknowledged: 
 
‘We rarely manage to penetrate national newspapers because…if you are not in Prague 
and do not know the right journalists, you simply won't make it in to (Prague based) 
papers. You may send out a hundred faxes, we tried to hold a press conference in 
Prague, but if you don't have contacts that you cultivated for years, you have almost no 
chance (Interview, 23/3/99). 
 
Third, SBM have always been active only in a peripheral region of Southern Bohemia, but at 
the same time they are engaged in a deep conflict with the local political elite, including the 
city hall in Ceske Budejovice. Large sections of this elite are in one way or another linked 
with Temelin. The mayor of Ceske Budejovice is a former employee at Temelin. This means 
that SBM encounter deeply rooted hostility even when they campaign on matters other than 
Temelin. Local power holders do not miss any opportunity to close access for SBM and 
 9 
prevent them from participating in regional or local environmental conflicts. The situation was 
summed up by an SBM activist:  
 
‘A commission that is supposed to supervise the preparation of the plan of strategic 
development of the South Bohemian region has recently been established. It is 
connected with the European Union's structural funds and will affect the development of 
the whole region on a long-term basis. We as SBM wanted to be a member of the 
commission...but the reaction of the mayor of Ceske Budejovice was: from ecological 
groups, anybody except SBM’ (Interview, 23/3/99) 
 
Fourth, the ability of SBM to mobilise Czech domestic resources has remained limited 
throughout the 1990s. They have not managed, nor have they made a serious attempt, to 
expand the size of membership of their organisation. They still have only about 150 members 
paying a small annual fee in quite a large, relatively prosperous region, in which there are 
many academics, students and others likely to be concerned about environmental issues. Like 
most Czech EMOs they have developed a dependence on foreign financial resources, which in 
the case of SBM were initially quite generous. However, SBM’s dependence on mostly 
Austrian sources of funding diminished their ability to integrate into the post-communist 
Czech polity. It discouraged them from moving beyond the region (their centre of gravity was 
in many respects Austria rather than Prague), and allowed them to function without the 
support of fee-paying members. Furthermore, while they were forced to co-operate with 
experts on nuclear energy due to the complicated nature of the issues, they apparently failed to 
tap local research potential in Ceske Budejovice on questions of nature conservation and land 
use planning, issues on which SBM also launched campaigns. 
 
 
 
Hnuti Duha13 – Rainbow Movement – FoE-CR 
 
Duha is perhaps the most prominent and successful EMO in the Czech Republic today. Its 
activists appear regularly in the media, and the organisation now recruits highly-paid 
professionals to run its various campaigns. Duha is widely recognised as the main voice of 
environmentalism in the country. Compared to other EMOs that emerged on the eve of the 
revolution, Duha is unique in the way it has developed, particularly in its internal organisation 
and strategy. In less than a generation Duha has moved from being a radical amorphous non-
hierarchic movement to a highly professional mainstream organisation employing 
conventional strategies. Duha’s ‘professionalism’ is in part due to its international links (it is 
officially the Czech branch of FoE) but also due to particular strategic choices. What 
distinguishes Duha’s campaigns from those of other EMOs is their capacity to link 
environmental issues to financial and social problems, whilst at the same time emphasising 
the ethical dimension of environmental degradation.14   
Yet despite many of the trappings of a western-style professional protest organisation, Duha’s 
strategies and internal organisation still reflect the context in which the organisation emerged 
and in which it operates. The legacy of authoritarian rule and the circumstances of its collapse, 
the particular nuances of post-Communist Czech political development (particularly the 
13 The information obtained on Hnuti Duha was obtained from several interviews during the period April 1993-
May, 1999 by both authors. 
14 For example, their campaign in 1999 successfully emphasised the financial cost of Temelin to the Czech tax 
payer. They portrayed the plant as an inefficient example of old-style communist investment that made little 
economic sense. 
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legacy of the Klaus era), the funding situation, and the relationship between the indigenous 
environmental movement and international western-based EMOs have shaped Duha’s 
development.  
 
The formation and profile of Duha 
Established in Brno, the second largest city in the Czech Republic, during the summer 1989, 
just prior to the ‘velvet revolution’, Duha was typical of environmental organisations during 
this period. It comprised a few young activists (secondary school students) who had 
previously been involved in party-sanctioned conservation organisations such as CSOP 
(Czech Union of Nature Conservation) or Brontosaurus (affiliated to the youth section of the 
Communist party). In the months prior to the revolution these activists formed part of the 
growing chorus of discontent that surrounded the decomposition of the party’s political 
authority. What distinguished Duha from the rest of the fledgling EMOs was their stated 
intention to address the causes and not just the consequences of unpropitious human actions. 
Though they were still some way from becoming a professional protest organisation, this 
immediately set the organisation on a distinctly political course. 
 
Funding and resources 
Although Duha has experienced periods of financial uncertainty, it is now relatively well-
resourced. It is able to offer reasonable salaries to its employees and to recruit in the national 
press for highly-trained professionals to work in the Brno and Prague offices. Local chapters 
are often small, self-funding operations which rely entirely on volunteers. Yet, Duha remains 
heavily dependent on external donors and the EU in particular. Though Duha has always 
raised revenue from its professional activities and services and also from the sale of published 
material, it has only recently established a fee-paying membership15 amongst Czech citizens 
and has begun to employ direct marketing techniques. Duha argue that a financial strategy 
based on donations from the Czech public was not previously realistic whereas now, almost a 
generation after the collapse of communism, levels of disposable income amongst sections of 
society most likely to give donations (public sector professionals, middle classes) make such a 
strategy more feasible.  
 
 
Internal organisation and strategies 
Initially Duha activists rejected a formal hierarchic organisational structure and the notion of 
non-active supporters, preferring activists to work independently on particular issues that were 
broadly defined by the ‘centre of operations’ in Brno. It rejected a ‘parliamentary’ strategy in 
favour of direct action based on a global agenda and an amorphous cell-like internal structure. 
However, by the mid-1990s this had altered.  A feature of Duha is the development of its 
activities around two basic pillars: centres in Brno and Prague whose task is to coordinate 
nation-wide political campaigns and a web of local groups involved in particular local issues. 
This enables the organisation to pursue grassroots protest campaigns alongside lobbying and 
participation in the policy process.16 
The transformation of the organisation during the 1990s is quite remarkable. Rather than 
radicalise the organisation, Duha’s response to the demise of movement-based politics from 
mid-1991 and the adversarial political climate of the first Klaus administration was to adopt a 
15 Hnuti Duha has about 500 fee-paying members at present. 
16 For example, the local Olomouc branch of Duha runs campaigns against Schweppes for no longer using 
returnable bottles and generally involve themselves in community issues, whereas the Brno and Prague offices 
are engaged in lobbying and policy (Interview with activists from Duha Olomouc, May 1999). 
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strategy based around lobbying on less-controversial issues, to deny that they were a political 
organisation, and to seek closer contacts with the political elite. Such a strategy was pursued 
despite the lack of a political dividend and the denial of political access to EMOs. A more 
hierarchical structure was adopted based on a clearly defined division of labour and an agenda 
of policies and issues on which the organisation would focus. The national centre in Brno and 
the Prague office deal with political campaigns whilst local offices would develop links with 
the public as well as working within local political structures. Though the 15 local branches 
retain a degree of autonomy, they operate within the confines of national campaigns and 
strategies. By 1999, Duha had 14 full-time employees. 
During the mid-1990s the focus of Duha’s campaigns became less esoteric and more focused 
on policy and regulation at the national level: to save and protect forest and nature reserves; 
opposition to gold processing and the activities of mining companies in Kasperske Hory; 
saving railways and opposing motorway construction. Reflecting their close involvement with 
FoE International, Duha has sought to relate ‘global’ campaigns such as ozone depletion to 
the specific ‘local’ context - the enactment of Czech legislation regulating the use of CFCs. 
Indeed, what has come to distinguish Duha from other Czech EMOs is the extent of their 
international contacts, largely with other national branches of FoE (particularly FoE-UK) but 
also with Greenpeace Austria. Duha's carefully developed management of their campaigns is 
modelled on FoE-UK: Duha now has strategic plans that are subject to updating every three 
years, and which form the basis of their strategy. The strong influence on Duha of a 
particularly British type of environmentalism is clearly evidenced by regular features 
reprinted from The Ecologist in Duha's monthly journal. 
In contrast to their approach in the early 1990s, the organisation is now more willing to co-
operate with other indigenous EMOs, and Duha activists all express the benefits of co-
operation and an informal division of labour amongst EMOs. This change in attitude reflects 
Duha’s confidence in its own strengths and also its strong individual identity within the Czech 
environmental movement. It is no longer a ‘catch-all’ environmental movement. 
Apart from attending the annual Temelin blockade (which from the mid-1990s ceased to be a 
radical direct action protest) and openly supporting anti-globalisation protestors,17 Duha’s 
strategy centres on lobbying and challenging environmentally-damaging actions through the 
publication of scientific reports and through participation in the EIA process. Indeed, Duha 
differs from the rest of Czech EMOs by its close links to social science academic circles, 
mainly in Brno. Most activists working in Duha's main office in Brno are past or current 
students of sociology, political science or law. Leading Czech academics working in the field 
of environmental studies within various social science disciplines regularly publish articles in 
Duha's monthly journal.  
Duha’s effort to shed its image of radicalism and become a professional lobbying organisation 
is reflected in the activities of the Prague office. Duha staff are recruited for their professional 
skills and, as a result, the organisation has become particularly adept at lobbying and holding 
press conferences. The inclusion within Duha's council of patrons of well-known artists, 
journalists and scholars, plus the internationally renowned Czech writer Ivan Klima, is also 
indicative of the organisation’s aspiration to be the leading professional environmental 
organisation, enmeshed within the institutional structure of the political process. Leading 
figures of Duha frequently discuss issues of radicalism and pragmatism in Duha's monthly 
journal, whose change of name in 1998 reflects the concerted effort of the organisation to 
build for itself an image more acceptable to the general public and the media. The original 
title The Last Generation (posledni generace) was replaced by the less controversial The 
Seventh Generation (sedma generace). In a recent article the former chairman and co-founder 
17 Duha supports anti-globalisation campaigners, though it does not join in direct action.   
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of Hnuti Duha, Jakub Patocka, addresses a long-term dilemma with which Duha has always 
been confronted: whether to operate within or outside the system (Patocka, 1999). The 
dilemma resurfaced with increased poignancy in the aftermath of the leak of the 1995 list of 
extremists that included Duha. The answer that Patocka gives is to ‘sit on the fence’ and to 
blockade Temelin as well as lobbying parliament and publishing expert reports. Yet in 
practice, and despite the growing wave of direct actions employed by EMOs elsewhere in 
Europe, Duha is reluctant to organise such campaigns in the Czech Republic, though they 
support direct actions initiated by other EMOs.  
Duha’s strategic choice over the Temelin campaign reflected a pragmatism and a capacity to 
frame protest in a way that will have maximum political impact at elite level whilst also 
obtaining public support. Though Duha remains resolutely opposed to the expansion of 
nuclear energy, during the mid-1990s they rejected a campaign of high-profile opposition in 
favour of a more pragmatic stance of opposing the storage of nuclear waste through NIMBY-
based campaigns in the areas likely to be affected. Similarly during 1999, when a critical 
government decision regarding the future of the Temelin plant was to be taken, Duha’s high-
profile campaign focused on the economic arguments against further state subsidies for the 
plant and argued that there was no need for the extra energy capacity. This approach was 
justified by only moderate levels of public support for the anti-nuclear campaign and a general 
lethargy amongst campaigners. Particularly revealing is that, despite having previously 
mounted a campaign against the polluting effects of coal production, part of Duha’s campaign 
focused on the negative economic impact that the completion of Temelin would have on 
northern Bohemian mining communities. 
 
What the Temelin case also revealed was just how far Duha had travelled along the road to 
professionalism, and how successful the organisation had been in gaining political access and 
proximity to the political elite. When President Havel decided to intervene openly in the 
debate surrounding Temelin, Duha activists from the Prague office provided him with 
information. They were also consulted widely in the media and their arguments formed part of 
the general discourse within which the debate occurred. 
However, the departure of many of the core activists of the Brno group in 1997 to form their 
own independent social-ecological movement (nesehnuti), is evidence of a major crisis in 
Duha.  The activists had become deeply dissatisfied with its lack of radicalism. Yet Duha has 
not completely lost its radical edge and ideological integrity. In 1998 Duha was the most 
vocal opponent of the intention of Nadace partenrstvi (Partnership Foundation), one of the 
main sources of funding for Czech EMOs, to accept grants from Monsanto. Duha launched a 
high-profile campaign accusing partnerstivi of betraying basic principles of the environmental 
movement. In a cash-strapped environmental movement, this was a particularly controversial 
conflict and Duha deserves credit for opening the debate. 
 
 
Conclusion  
Our objective in this paper has been to identify the factors shaping the organisational logic 
and strategic choices of two quite different Czech EMOs. SBM is a local organisation, 
dependent almost entirely on foreign donors, reluctant to expand its membership, and reliant 
on a small core of volunteers. Duha directs its campaigns at elite level, has (quite recently) 
begun to expand its fee-paying membership base, and has become increasingly professional in 
its operations. Both campaign against the Temelin nuclear power plant. On a theoretical level, 
our objective has been to consider the extent to which hypotheses regarding the impact of 
resources and the political process on organisations are applicable to Czech EMOs. 
 13 
Concerned to avoid assumptions that EMOs in CEE states are all on a trajectory towards 
professionalism, institutionalisation and formalisation, and rejecting the notion that the Czech 
movement is necessarily on the same developmental course as environmental movements in 
established democracies and thus need to ‘catch-up’, we have emphasised the specific context 
of post-communist political reform and economic restructuring as a key determinant of EMO 
activity and behaviour. 
Duha and SBM in many senses represent poles of the formal movement – professionalism and 
institutionalisation, versus more ideologically radical regional protest organisation. Though 
quite different, the strategic choices and actions of both organisations can be understood as 
responses to the underlying dependency of EMOs on external donors for resources. Both have 
been encouraged by foreign donors to become more professional in their operations and 
campaigns (SBM expanded its protest operations, hired experts and took on other issues 
during the mid 1990s), yet in each case such ‘professionalism’ or the move towards the 
Professional Protest Organisation model, is a hybrid form, moderated by the fact that 
dependency on external funding removed the need to establish mass memberships and to 
deepen links within Czech society. Assumptions regarding the impact of resources on 
strategic choice and campaigns require, therefore, careful qualification when applied to 
movement organisations beyond established capitalist democracies. 
The case studies also illustrate that assumptions regarding the impact of various aspects of the 
political process on organisations require qualification in the context of a new democracy 
undergoing profound social, political and economic change. A strong, centralised and 
exclusive state, hostile to the environmental movement during much of the 1990s did not 
radicalise Duha as the theoretical literature might have led us to suppose. Other factors, such 
as the absence of funding, the legacy of authoritarian rule, and the political immaturity of the 
Czech movement explain why Duha jettisoned radical strategies and ideas in response to their 
exclusion by the Klaus government. Similarly, when applying theoretical assumptions 
regarding the impact of particular types of state and organisational behaviour, it is important 
to recognise the role of the EU and other external agencies in setting policy agenda and 
funding EMOs. This fundamentally alters the relationship between organisations and the 
political process. 
The case of SBM also suggests that decentralisation of state power does not necessarily 
deliver a dividend in terms of political access. SBM’s campaign against Temelin was 
conducted entirely at the local level, despite the fact that decisions regarding the plant were 
ultimately taken centrally. Yet it seems unlikely that greater decentralisation would have 
augmented SBM’s position, as the specific local opportunity structure was particularly hostile 
and more closed and exclusive. SBM’s exclusion was based on their gender, political and 
social attitudes, and the powerful influence of TNCs, the capacity of which to exert an impact 
on local politicians and to exclude environmentalists proved to be greater at the local than at 
the national level. 
 
Whilst both Diani and Donati’s model and the theoretical literature identifying political 
variables that shape organisational behaviour in western democracies are broadly useful in 
understanding Czech EMOs, our case studies suggest that similarities in behaviour between 
Czech EMOs and western organisations are somewhat superficial. In the cases of Duha and 
SBM, the explanatory factors are more complex and varied. Professionalism or reliance on 
conventional strategies cannot be explained solely in terms of the availability of resources, or 
by the nature of the issues involved. Cultural and political legacies of the recent past, plus the 
peculiar context of the economic and political reform agenda transmute the impact of 
recognised variables and exert a specific impact on the strategic choices of EMOs. 
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